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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Divorce Decree of Tamera Malm should be set aside under 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant, 
James S. Malm, admits to having made false representations 
concerning his financial status; yet in his Brief he seeks to 
justify such action. He claims that the false information 
affected only the child support payments and since he was paying 
more than required for a $1500.00 per month income his actions 
were justified. However, such an argument ignores the fact that 
Plaintiff's misrepresentations permeated and affected the entire 
stipulation. It had an effect on not only the child support 
payment stipulated to, but also on the alimony, retirement plan, 
debts, property and attorney fee negotiations. The Plaintiff 
relied on the Defendant's misrepresentation in waiving alimony 
payments, in agreeing to a limited percentage of Plaintiff's 
retirement plan, in accepting liability for a portion of the 
outstanding debts, in dividing real and personal property and in 
foregoing attorney's fees. 
The Plaintiff, while acting with reasonable reliance on the 
misrepresentation, was induced to agree to the settlement. In 
doing so, the Plaintiff was injured and such action brings the 
Defendant's conduct within the boundaries of fraud as defined in 
Utah. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Defendant's 
earnings were greater than $2,000 per month. The Defendant has 
not presented evidence to rebut this information. The Motion to 
Set Aside the Divorce Decree under Rule 60(b) is appropriate and 
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allows a fair assessment of Defendant's earnings. With all facts 
before the court a just and equitable Divorce Decree would 
result. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL POSTURE 
MERITS SETTING ASIDE THE DIVORCE DECREE AND 
REQUIRING PRESENTATION OF SUBSTANTIATING 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The Defendant maintains in his Brief that the decree should 
not be set aside because his misrepresentations had no 
substantial effect on the child support payment and that indeed, 
he was paying more than the child support schedule required. 
Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that Plaintiff's 
misrepresentation influenced the Plaintiff in every aspect of 
negotiating the stipulation and overall had a tremendous effect 
on the agreement. 
The Defendant's misrepresentations in the earlier stages of 
this action leave at issue the reliability of his information. 
There has been no evidence presented to support the Defendant's 
assessment of his financial status nor assurance that the second 
representations are correct. Plaintiff's discovery indicates 
that the Defendant's earnings could have easily exceeded 
$2,000.00. 
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II. DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION TO 
THE PLAINTIFF PERMEATED EVERY ASPECT OF THE 
STIPULATION AGREEMENT, RESULTING IK 
INEQUITABLE TERMS AND WARRANTING THE DIVORCE 
DECREE BE SET ASIDE. 
The Defendant relies on Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
App. 1989) and the standard set out in Land v. Land, 605 P. 2d 
1248 (Utah 1980) to dispute the necessity of setting aside the 
Decree. Both are distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Birch
 f the appellant made similar allegations of 
fraudulent representation of income. The court dismissed these 
allegations because they dealt strictly with income and "would 
not have been a legitimate factor in determining a division of 
the party's property." _Idl. at 1117. However, in the present 
action, income goes directly to the core of the stipulation. The 
parties were not merely dividing property. Rather, their 
negotiations also addressed alimony payments, outstanding debts, 
attorney's fees and future retirement plans. All issues 
encompassing and necessitating correct financial data. 
The Defendant maintains that the standard of Land applies. 
The court in Land considered the ambiguity of an express term 
within the divorce stipulation, not intentional 
misrepresentations of the parties. The court held that equity is 
not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
contracted away. One cannot voluntarily contract away an unknown 
right or privilege. Justice would not be served nor equity 
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principles adhered to by allowing unknown or undisclosed 
information to be construed as a voluntary assent. 
Another aspect to the standard of setting aside a divorce 
decree is whether the points at issue are severable. The court 
in Farley v. Farley, 431 P.2d 133 (Utah 1967)
 f recognized the 
inherent problems in severing the property distribution from the 
relationship and held that "the portion of the judgment which was 
void was separable, so that the remaining portion . . . was 
valid. I<3. at 139. This notion was reiterated in In Re Marriage 
of Modnicky 663 P.2d 187 (Cal. 1983). The court held that the 
husband's activity was extrinsic fraud. Those portions of the 
agreement that were severable were set aside with the termination 
of the marital relationship remaining in effect. 
In the case at barf the Defendant's misrepresentations had 
an effect on more than the child support payment. The Plaintiff 
relied on the Defendant's financial information. The Defendant's 
financial condition had a substantial effect on the entire 
agreement. It would be difficult to isolate one particular issue 
such as the child support payment. Therefore, the Stipulations 
and Divorce Decree in general warrant being set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant failed to provide evidence of his earnings to 
refute prior misrepresentations. His representations permeated 
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the entire agreement and deprived the Plaintiff of a fair 
settlement. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the District Court's decision and grant Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside Decree. Additionally/ Plaintiff requests 
that she be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred in this 
action which were necessitated by the Defendant's actions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^ \d day of Octoberf 1989. 
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